



21.05.2020 - ore 10.30  
Piattaforma Microsoft Teams - cod. jtqd08z

# Rational Coordination Without Beliefs

Organizzatori:  
Patrizia Sbriglia e Marco Stimolo

## Description

Can rational agents coordinate? According to standard game theory they cannot, even when there is a uniquely best way of doing it. We defend an alternative theory of 'Solution Thinking' that is able to save the intuition that choosing the best equilibrium is rational, without changing the game structure, or relinquishing individual agency. Solution Thinking is supported by a commonsensical Principle of Relevant Information that every theory of rational decision must satisfy.

## Presents

Francesco Guala  
Professore Ordinario di Economia  
Politica presso il Dipartimento di  
Filosofia dell'Università di Milano